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THE CONSEQUENCES OF CITIZENS UNITED: WHAT DO THE
LAWYERS SAY?
ANN SOUTHWORTH*

I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay considers lawyers’ perspectives on the consequences of one
of the most controversial Supreme Court decisions of our time—Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, 1 a 5–4 decision overturning limits
on corporate and union expenditures in federal elections. Drawing on confidential interviews with thirty-one lawyers who participated in the case as
counsel for parties and amici, 2 it explores what the lawyers say about how
the decision has affected the political process.
Why should we care about the views of these lawyers? As evidence of
how the Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United actually has affected the
political process, there are good reasons to be cautious. The lawyers may be
deeply committed to arguments they made in briefs and unwilling to concede
valid counterarguments. Their commentary may also reflect their ongoing
efforts to influence the debate. On the other hand, many of these lawyers are
close observers of how Citizens United has played out on the ground, and
their reflections offer a useful complement to opinions expressed by scholars, politicians, advocacy groups, and ordinary citizens. 3 The fact that lawyers on both sides largely agree about the short-term consequences of
* Professor and Founding Faculty Member, University of California, Irvine School of Law. I am indebted
to the lawyers who allowed me to interview them for this research and sacrificed their valuable time to
help me understand their work and perspectives. I am also grateful to Rick Hasen and Bryant Garth, who
commented on an earlier draft.
1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2. I have thus far conducted fifty-two interviews with lawyers who have been active on campaign
finance regulatory issues since 2006, when John Roberts became Chief Justice. This Essay draws primarily from interviews with the thirty-one lawyers who filed briefs on behalf of parties or amici in Citizens
United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Of those thirty-one lawyers, fifteen filed briefs on the side of the Federal
Election Commission, and sixteen filed briefs on the side of Citizens United.
3. For some data on those other perspectives, see Albert W. Alschuler et al., Why Limits on Contributions to Super PACS Should Survive Citizens United, (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Papers Series, Paper No. 626, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3015462
[https://perma.cc/ZG6Z-YDRW].
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Citizens United also provides some assurance about the reliability of their
views on that topic.
These lawyers’ perspectives about the consequences of Citizens United
may also be worth considering for reasons having nothing to do with their
accuracy or truthfulness. Lawyers’ ideas and rhetoric play an important part
in constitutional interpretation and constitutional change in the United
States. 4 Even if Supreme Court Justices are the ultimate arbiters of constitutional questions that come before the Court, they nevertheless rely on lawyers to supply arguments to explain, support, and defend their decisions.5
Lawyers are also part of the “audience” for judicial decision-making—those
whose approval the Justices care about and who hold them accountable. 6
Lawyers’ selection of frames sometimes influence judicial outcomes 7 and
shape perceptions in other important arenas of contest over constitutional
interpretation, including the media and popular opinion. 8 Their commentary
may also reveal something about interests potentially affected and about
popular attitudes and legal consciousness, since lawyers serve as intermediaries, translating laypersons’ claims and perspectives into legal language9
and interpreting the Court’s opinions for the public. 10 As Jack Balkin has
suggested, lawyers are influenced by the “larger public culture—and subcultures—in which [they] live,” and they also shape those subcultures. 11 In
4. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN
UNJUST WORLD 86–91 (2011).
5. See AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND
THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 12 (2015); MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC SWEET, ON LAW,
POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION (2002).
6. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR (2006); Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the
American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515 (2010).
7. See LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE:
ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 307 (1992); GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW
SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS (2009); Justin Wedeking, Supreme Court Litigants
and Strategic Framing, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 617 (2010).
8. See generally Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111
MICH. L. REV. 877 (2013) (reviewing BALKIN, supra note 4) [hereinafter NeJaime, Constitutional
Change]; Douglas NeJaime, Framing (In)Equality for Same-Sex Couples, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE
184 (2013); Mary Ziegler, Grassroots Originalism: Rethinking the Politics of Judicial Philosophy, 51 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 201 (2013); Cf. DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN
ACTIVISTS TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 225 (2016) (arguing that “framing and messaging are as
essential to a constitutional campaign as formal legal argument”).
9. NeJaime, Constitutional Change, supra note 8, at 895; BALKIN, supra note 4, at 238.
10. Cf. Jane S. Schacter, Obergefell’s Audiences, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1011, 1028–34 (2016) (noting
the easy availability of Supreme Court opinions through social media but observing that most readers of
the opinions are lawyers and that the public’s response is likely shaped by how those lawyers and public
officials, movement leaders, public intellectuals, and others respond).
11. BALKIN, supra note 4, at 16 (“Lawyers . . . soak up conceptions of what is just and reasonable
from their society, and from the subcultures they inhabit, as a tree soaks up water through its roots. Conversely, they also influence non-professionals through their work in shaping official law.”); cf. ROBERT

2018]

THE CONSEQUENCES OF CITIZENS UNITED

527

short, lawyers’ commentary on the consequences of Citizens United provides
a window into how they seek to influence constitutional politics through their
work, and it may also reveal something about how their clients and the constituencies they claim to serve understand the issues, even if the direction of
influence is unclear.
This Essay explores a polarized world of advocacy around campaign
finance regulation. 12 Part II briefly summarizes the facts and holding of Citizens United and the deeply divided perspectives of the Justices on what was
at stake in the case. Part III considers the views of lawyers who sided with
the Federal Election Commission, and Part IV describes the perspectives of
lawyers on the challengers’ side. Part V highlights the primary points of consensus and discord, showing that the lawyers generally agree about the direct
consequences of Citizens United but strongly disagree about the broader implications and what lessons the public should draw. It explores the competing
frames that lawyers bring to campaign finance regulation and fundamental
differences in their attitudes about where the greatest threats to representative democracy lie. As one lawyer noted, “[t]here’s this amazing dichotomy
between [the] two worldviews.” 13
I use the term “defenders” throughout this Essay to describe the lawyers
who championed the legal restrictions invalidated in Citizens United and
“challengers” to refer to lawyers who urged the Court to strike down these
limitations on First Amendment grounds.
II. THE CITIZENS UNITED DECISION
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission involved a conservative political action committee’s plan to air on cable television a movie that
was highly critical of Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. The
group had already distributed the film on DVD and in theaters, but it wanted

W. GORDON, TAMING THE PAST: ESSAYS ON LAW IN HISTORY AND HISTORY IN LAW 277–78 (2017) (noting that “mandarin materials” produced by lawyers and judges “are among the richest artifacts of a society’s legal consciousness”; that there are likely to be “trickle-down effects” from elites to other elements
of society, as well as “refracted trickle-up effects” to lawyers and judges from “a consciousness whose
primary producers are to the found all over the society”).
12. This Essay does not attempt to capture the lawyers’ views about the process that led to the
ruling in Citizens United, the breadth of the holding, the quality of the Court’s analysis, and its use of
precedent. Nor does it consider their perspectives on other major campaign finance decisions of the Roberts Court and the jurisprudential legacy on which they build. I will address those questions and others in
a forthcoming book on the lawyers, organizations and patrons on both sides of campaign finance litigation
in the Roberts Court and their roles in generating and promoting competing understandings of the relationship between the First Amendment and money in politics.
13. Confidential Interview 14.
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to use treasury funds to make it available as a free download to cable subscribers. Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 14 (BCRA, also
known as McCain–Feingold) prohibited corporations and unions from using
money from their general treasuries to fund “electioneering communications,” defined as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that
“refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is made within
sixty days before a general election or thirty days before a primary election. 15
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that section 203 prevented Citizens United from using treasury funds to distribute
the movie within thirty days of the 2008 Democratic primaries. Citizens
United still could have paid for the ads and distribution through its political
action committee, and it could have used its general treasury funds for this
purpose if it had declined to take money from for-profit corporations.
The Supreme Court heard the case in March 2009 but did not decide the
case that term. Rather, in a highly unusual move, it called for supplemental
briefing and a second oral argument early in the following term on whether
the Court should find section 203 unconstitutional and upset two precedents.
In January 2010, the Supreme Court invalidated section 203 and held that
corporations—and, by extension, labor unions—have a First Amendment
right to spend unlimited amounts independently to support or oppose candidates for public office. It found that corporations should not “be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because [they] are not ‘natural
persons.’” 16 The Court further determined that campaign expenditures could
not be regulated for the purpose of limiting access and influence; the only
basis for restricting corporate expenditure was to prevent quid pro quo corruption—a direct exchange of money for political favors, and the Court
found that the government could not prove that independent expenditures
could lead to such corruption or the appearance of corruption. The decision
overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 17 which upheld a
Michigan statute limiting the amount that corporations could spend to support or oppose candidates in elections for state office. It also partially overruled McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 18 which upheld the very
provision of the BCRA that the Court found unconstitutional in Citizens
United. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

2 U.S.C. § 441b (2002).
2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i).
558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010).
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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Justice Stevens wrote a passionate dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Sotomayor. Stevens’s dissenting opinion criticized the majority
for overturning Austin and parts of McConnell when it could instead have
ruled in Citizens United’s favor on narrower grounds.19 He rejected the majority’s claim that corporations hold the same right to spend money in elections as natural persons. 20 He also took strong issue with the majority’s
assertion that the only justification for regulating campaign expenditures is
to avoid quid pro quo corruption. 21 He asserted that this “crabbed view of
corruption” 22 “disregards our constitutional history and the fundamental demands of a democratic society.” 23
The equation of election spending with speech and the corruption rationale for evaluating the constitutionality of campaign finance regulations
date back to the Supreme Court’s 1976 opinion in Buckley v. Valeo. 24 Buckley upheld contribution limits and disclosure requirements imposed by the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974 (FECA), but
struck down limits on campaign spending. The Court found that political
contributions and expenditures implicated core political speech 25 and that
19. The dissenters argued that the Court could have decided that a feature-length film distributed
through video-on-demand to willing viewers does not qualify as an “electioneering communication” under § 203 of BCRA, or that Citizens United was entitled to a media exemption to the spending rules, or
that § 203 was unconstitutional as applied to Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation that accepted only
de minimis contributions from for-profit corporations. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 405–08 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20. The dissent took strong issue with the Court’s critique of identity-based distinctions:
The basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling is its iteration, and constant reiteration, of
the proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on a speaker’s identity, including its “identity” as a corporation. . . . The conceit that corporations must be treated
identically to natural persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also inadequate
to justify the Court’s disposition of this case.
Id. at 394.
21. Id. at 313.
22. Id. at 447 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 152).
23. Id.
24. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
25. Here is some of the key language from Buckley on the relationship between speech and election
spending:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This
is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the
expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate’s increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media
for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable
instruments of effective political speech.
The expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent substantial rather than merely
theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech. . . .
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campaign finance regulations were consistent with the First Amendment’s
free speech and association guarantees only if they could be justified in terms
of the government’s interest in preventing “corruption” or “the appearance
of corruption.” 26 Without precisely defining those terms, 27 it found that the
interest in preventing the reality and appearance of corruption was a constitutionally sufficient justification for the contribution limit because
contribu-tions could corrupt politicians, but that it did not justify the
limitations on independent expenditures, which could not.28 The Buckley
Court rejected al-ternative rationales for campaign spending limits based
in arguments about the government’s interest in promoting political
equality.29
In Citizens United, the majority and dissent painted starkly
different pictures of the competing stakes. The majority equated campaign
spending with political speech and asserted that protecting such speech, from
whatever source, is a foundational principle enshrined in the First
Amendment. Justice Kennedy’s opinion expressed outrage about
section 203’s purposes: “[U]nder our law and our tradition it seems
stranger than fiction for our Gov-ernment to make . . . political speech a
crime. Yet this is the statute’s purpose and design.”30 The majority invoked
the word “speech” and its variations 270 times, twice as often as the
dissent, and it used the word “ban” forty-two times to characterize the
statute’s requirement that any corporate expendi-tures on electioneering
must come from PACs rather than general treasury funds.
Justice Stevens’s dissent took strong issue with the majority’s finding
that corporations must be treated identically to natural persons in the
political sphere.31 Stevens wrote that the Court’s ruling was “profoundly
misguided” and “threatens to undermine the integrity of elected
By contrast
withthe
a limitation upon expenditures for political expression, a limitation upon
institutions
across
the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee
entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.

Id. at 19–20.
In his partial dissent, Justice Byron White rejected the majority’s equation of political spending
and speech: “[T]he argument that money is speech and that limiting the flow of money to the speaker
violates the First Amendment proves entirely too much.” Id. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
26. Id. at 26–27 (majority opinion).
27. Id. at 27–28 (“[L]aws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only the most
blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action.”).
28. Id. at 26, 45.
29. Id. at 48–49 (concluding that the idea that the government “may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment”).
30. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (majority opinion).
31. Id. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Nation.” 32 His opinion also complained about the majority’s emphasis on the
specter of government suppression of dissent: “Pervading the Court’s analysis is the ominous image of a ‘categorical ba[n]’ on corporate speech. Indeed,
the majority invokes the specter of a ‘ban’ on nearly every page of its opinion. This characterization is highly misleading . . . .” 33
In his book on campaign finance and the Constitution, Robert Post characterized the strong disagreements between the majority and dissent in Citizens United as a “horrifying disjunction.” 34 He observed that the two sides
“seemed to inhabit entirely different constitutional universes,” reflecting “a
country divided, not united.” 35 My research suggests that lawyers active on
campaign finance issues, like the Justices they seek to persuade, inhabit different constitutional universes. As they battle to shape the law and public
policy through the courts, legislatures, and agencies, and as they compete to
shape public opinion through the media, these lawyers project radically different visions of the First Amendment and its relationship to money in politics.
III. THE DEFENDERS’ VIEWS
The fifteen defenders whose views I summarize here were overwhelmingly, though not exclusively, Democrats who attended elite law schools and
worked in major metropolitan areas, mostly in D.C. and the Northeast. In

32. Id. at 394, 396.
33. Id. at 415 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
34. ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 4
(2014).
35. Id. The ideological divide among the Justices on campaign finance regulation is not new. Writing about Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), Robert Mutch noted “the
‘unbridgeable ideological gulf’ between the majority and dissenting opinions.” ROBERT E. MUTCH,
BUYING THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 160 (2014). In 2007, Lillian BeVier, a
strong opponent of campaign finance regulation, wrote:
There is little hope for reconciliation of the competing views of the current majority and
the dissenters. Their disagreement is far more fundamental than a simple dispute about doctrine. . . . The problem . . . is that the justices do not reason from the same premises, either as a
matter of First Amendment principle or as a matter of the empirical assumptions that drive their
respective analyses. They assess the worth of political freedom differently. They entertain
wildly divergent assessments of the need for legislation to ‘‘promote democracy.’’ And they
hold entirely disparate views about either the possibility that legislation can actually effectuate
genuine improvement or the reliability of the elected officeholders who claim to have acted as
guardians of the interests of those who seek to have them voted out of office. . . .
. . . Compromise on such matters is not in the cards.
Lillian R. BeVier, First Amendment Basics Redux: Buckley v. Valeo to FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 77, 112–13.
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these respects, the defenders’ characteristics reflect those of the larger category of all lawyers who filed briefs on the FEC’s side in the case. 36
Not all of the defenders were particularly troubled that the plaintiff, Citizens United, prevailed; several noted that they would not have been shocked
or particularly concerned if the Court had ruled in Citizens United’s favor on
narrower grounds. But they all disapproved of the holding’s breadth, the
Court’s finding that commercial corporations have the same First Amendment rights as ordinary individuals to spend on elections, and the opinion’s
narrow definition of corruption.
Defenders decried the Supreme Court’s “activism” in finding section
203 of the BCRA unconstitutional and overruling Austin and parts of
McConnell. One defender grumbled that “[t]he Supreme Court majority won
the case that they brought . . . and the process of this case was awful. We
were not allowed to build any kind of record.” 37 Another said of the Court’s
dismantling of key features of existing campaign finance law in Citizens
United: “They did it, in my view, in a completely sort of lawless way, untethered to the precedent and untethered to the facts.” 38
Defenders also uniformly rejected the idea that commercial corporations should hold the same rights to political expression as individual persons. This comment was typical:
I think that government can appropriately . . . limit participation in politics
to human beings, which would include organizations of human beings that
I don’t think needs to include entities that are created for economic purposes to amass wealth as participants in a market economy. I don’t think
they need to be privileged with the ability to deploy that as if they were
flesh and blood people, or even coalitions or sort of membership groups
of flesh and blood people. I think that the idea that a corporation that is
organized to be in business is for First Amendment purposes indistinguishable from a human being is not correct. And I think one area where
it’s legitimate to treat them differently is in political participation. 39

Another lawyer reached the same conclusion but more directly anchored his
argument in the Constitution’s text and history, which, he said, require us to
recognize “this fundamental divide between living, breathing persons who
the Declaration tells us were created and given unalienable human rights,
36. See Ann Southworth, Elements of the Support Structure for Campaign Finance Litigation in
the Roberts Court, LAW & SOC. INQ. 1, 18–20 (2017) (finding that eighty-one percent of the fifty-four
lawyers who filed party or amicus briefs on the FEC’s side in Citizens United worked in D.C. or the
Northeast, and eighty-seven percent attended law schools ranked in the top twenty by U.S News & World
Report).
37. Confidential Interview 18.
38. Confidential Interview 22.
39. Confidential Interview 34.

2018]

THE CONSEQUENCES OF CITIZENS UNITED

533

and corporations who were created to power the economy but with a recognition that they would be subject to regulation to ensure that they didn’t
abuse their special privileges.” 40
Regarding the definition of corruption used in Citizens United, lawyers
complained about both process and substance. One strongly denied that the
definition followed from the cited precedents: “[A]ll the cases between Buckley and Citizens United said the same thing. They talked about undue influence and access. They didn’t just talk about quid pro quo corruption. It’s just
a lie. But once you write it once with five votes, there it is, it’s the law of the
land.” 41 Another complained that “the Roberts Court . . . has so narrowed
and eviscerated the meaning of corruption that it almost no longer provides
any platform to stand on in terms of justifying regulation of money in politics. And that narrow corruption frame, in my view, doesn’t speak to the
deepest values that we need to talk about in defending the regulation of
money in politics.” 42 Another defender observed that
[t]he corruption rationale, the definition of corruption, prior to Citizens
United was bad enough and it’s a cramped framework but, at least the
courts had managed to bend and stretch it to mean so many different
things. But now that it’s limited to quid pro quo corruption, it’s absurdly
narrow. 43

One lawyer warned that “we’re really knocking on the door of just turning
[the definition] into bribery. I think that’s a harmful development.” 44
The defenders generally conceded that Citizens United has not unleashed a wave of massive for-profit corporate spending in elections, as some
of the decision’s critics had predicted at the time of the decision. 45 One defender acknowledged that the consequences have been less momentous than
expected:

40. Confidential Interview 7.
41. Confidential Interview 22.
42. Confidential Interview 23.
43. Confidential Interview 47.
44. Confidential Interview 4.
45. See, e.g., Editorial, The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/opinion/22fri1.html [http://perma.cc/MY99-SW4U] (“With a single, disastrous 5-to-4 ruling, the Supreme Court has thrust politics back to the robber-baron era of the
19th century. Disingenuously waving the flag of the First Amendment, the court’s conservative majority
has paved the way for corporations to use their vast treasuries to overwhelm elections and intimidate
elected officials into doing their bidding.”); Editorial, Corporate Money in Politics, WASH. POST (May
9,
2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/08/AR2010050803134_pf.html [https://perma.cc/6FQM-C4WB] (“The Supreme Court’s
ruling in the Citizens United campaign finance case opened a dangerous pathway for corporations to
spend money in direct support of—or in opposition to—candidates for federal office.”).
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Are we down to the political process that was essentially dominated by
unlimited corporate spending? That’s not actually what happened. You’re
not seeing . . . . And I’m not saying it never will happen. . . But you’re not
seeing Mobil Oil or JP Morgan or Pepsi Cola or whatever suddenly pumping vast amounts of money into independent expenditures to influence the
outcome of elections. . . So I think, in that sense, it may be, in the short
term at least, not knowing what’s going to happen next, less significant
than people thought. 46

Another defender asserted that while “you don't see business corporations
doing a tremendous amount of political spending in their own names” because they do not perceive that it’s an effective strategy, “there's still a direct
effect of non-profit corporations that receive large amounts of corporate
funding, engaging now directly in political speech that would not have been
permissible prior to Citizen's United.” 47 He noted that one of the Roberts
Court’s previous rulings, Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right
to Life, Inc., 48 had already found that BCRA’s limitations on corporate electioneering were unconstitutional as applied to issue advocacy—that they
were permissible only as to “express advocacy or its functional equivalent.” 49 But Citizens United eliminated the need to distinguish between issue
and express advocacy: “So the Chamber of Commerce now no longer has to
worry about whether its advocacy crosses the line. I mean, [Wisconsin Right
to Life] had already allowed them to engage in non-express advocacy. Now
they don't even have to worry.” 50
Some defenders emphasized that it was never their primary concern that
business corporations would pour money directly into election campaigns.
One said:
We weren’t that concerned that Chevron and Exxon and McDonald’s and
Wendy’s and Pepsi and Coke were going to jump into elections and spend
a bunch of money . . . . We didn’t think that would happen because generally businesses don’t want their names explicitly associated with partisan politics because it alienates huge sections of their consumer base. 51

46. Confidential Interview 12.
47. Confidential Interview 34.
48. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
49. Id. at 465.
50. Confidential Interview 34.
51. Confidential Interview 10. For an example of consumer backlash triggered by a business’s political contribution, consider the response to Target’s contribution to a business group that supported Republican Tom Emmer’s campaign for Minnesota governor. Emmer was a prominent opponent of samesex marriage. See Josh Duboff, Target Issues Apology After Donation to Anti-Gay, Conservative Republican, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 5, 2010, 9:30 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2010/08/target_issues_apology_after_do.html [https://perma.cc/LZP6-RVHE].
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Rather, defenders worried that corporations and their owners would channel
corporate money into nonprofit groups that do not disclose their donors:
“What we were concerned about is that 501(c)(4) corporations like the plaintiffs, Citizens United, would be free to serve as conduits for business community money and evade disclosure, and that’s exactly what has unfolded.”52
Some defenders also predicted that for-profit corporations would become increasingly willing to devote substantial amounts of money to influence elections in the wake of Citizens United. One said that the individual
business owners, or business owners coordinating through PACs, now handle political spending that serves their business interests: “Corporations
themselves, I don’t think, have poured a great deal of money in. But then
they don’t have to. . . It’s the rich guys that own them.” 53 But this lawyer
asserted that corporations would get more directly into the game when they
concluded that the strategy would benefit them: “There’s a slight inhibition
now, and the inhibition now is because General Motors doesn’t want to sell
Democratic cars and Ford doesn’t want to sell Republican cars. . . But there
will come settings in which the stakes are such that they won’t hold back.” 54
Several defenders claimed that one of the worst consequences of Citizens United is an indirect one—the large amount of money now contributed
to “independent-expenditure only committees,” more commonly known as
Super PACs. In SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, 55 the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals held that limits on contributions to Super PACs are
unconstitutional; it struck down a federal statute that limited such contributions to $5000 per year. 56 The court based its reasoning on language in Citizens United indicating that corporations could make unlimited independent
expenditures because independent expenditures are not corrupting. 57 SpeechNow held that “[i]n light of the Court’s holding as a matter of law that independent expenditures do not corrupt or create the appearance
of . . . corruption, contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption.” 58 Super PACs can now raise unlimited funds from individuals, corporations,
unions, nonprofits, and other sources.

52. Confidential Interview 10.
53. Confidential Interview 28.
54. Id.
55. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
56. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(C) (2016).
57. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010) (“[W]e now conclude that independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”).
58. 599 F.3d at 694.
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In the years since SpeechNow, Super PACs have flourished and multiplied. Super PAC spending increased from $609 million in the 2012 election
cycle to $1.06 billion in the 2016 cycle, and the number of Super PACs almost doubled in those years from 1265 to 2392. 59 In the 2016 election, liberal
Super PACs spent $440 million, and conservative Super PACs spent $648.2
million. 60 Sixty-eight percent of the $1.6 billion raised by Super PACs in the
2016 federal election cycle came from 100 individuals and groups. 61 Super
PAC spending in the 2016 election cycle constituted sixty-three percent of
all reported spending on federal campaigns. 62
The defenders generally saw the rise of Super PACs as a momentous
and highly problematic development. One said that “[t]he Super PAC . . . has
really transformed the political landscape . . . . You just have massive infusions of money from sources that are able to give in the hundreds of thousands and millions of dollars, concentrated in entities that then expend it in
unlimited amounts.” 63 Another asserted that Super PACs have facilitated
“the vast increase in the amount of money from the one-tenth of the one
percent.” 64 The defenders acknowledged that most of the money contributed
thus far to Super PACs has come not from commercial corporations but from
wealthy individuals, who have long been legally permitted to make unlimited
independent expenditures in connection with elections under the Buckley
framework. 65 One stressed that “that’s the thing people don’t understand,
that the money coming from individuals, the big wealthy donors, could come
before Citizens United and can come now.” 66 Another lawyer observed that
“[w]hat you are seeing is a lot of money that’s attributed to Citizens United
but it’s being spent by very wealthy people, typically individuals—individuals who before this case could have gone ahead and spent that money directly anyway.” 67 But prior to SpeechNow, wealthy individuals who wanted
59. Outside Spending, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/WN24-392Z].
60. Emily Dalgo & Ashley Balcerzak, Seven Years Later: Blurred Boundaries, More Money, CTR.
FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS: OPENSECRETS BLOG (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2017/01/citizens-united-7-years-later/ [https://perma.cc/7KHZ-T935].
61. See 2016 Super PACs: How Many Donors Give?, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor_stats.php?cycle=2016&type=B
[https://perma.cc/A7RR-QDKW].
62. Outside Spending, supra note 59.
63. Confidential Interview 34.
64. Confidential Interview 28.
65. The amounts involved are large: in the 2016 election cycle, 135 donors gave more than $1
million to outside groups, including Super PACs, “dark money” groups, and other types of outside groups.
Dalgo & Balcerzak, supra note 60.
66. Confidential Interview 11.
67. Confidential Interview 12.
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to spend huge sums to influence elections would have been required to take
personal responsibility for the advertisements that the individuals placed (“I
am Bob Billionaire, and I approve the message.”) 68
Some defenders noted that the consequences of Citizens United as to
both corporations and wealthy individuals have been more “psychological”
than legal. One explained that “[t]he game that you played” before Citizens
United “was that companies stayed away from express advocacy” or “they
would fund organizations and you would get these . . . letters of assurance
that the organization would not do anything that would require them to disclose the donors. . . . It’s a concern to this day.” He added, “but I’ve noticed
a psychological difference, which is prior to Citizens United, had they ended
up funding express advocacy, they were doing something illegal. After Citizens United it was no longer illegal; they’d just be embarrassed.” 69 Another
defender described a similar psychological phenomenon with respect to
wealthy individuals:
I think the Citizens United opinion unlocked any inhibitions that very
wealthy people had to work out mechanisms to pour money into the campaign. The Super PACs and the vast increase in the amount of money from
the one-tenth of the one percent, in part, I think, is attributable to the Supreme Court—the powerful rhetoric in the Supreme Court. 70

Defenders scorned several factual premises of the majority opinion. In
particular, they found highly implausible its assumption that, because expenditures are legally required to be independent of campaigns, they actually
are independent. One said that the Court seemed to “have no idea that the
FEC has gutted all the coordination rules . . . plus the fact the FEC doesn’t
enforce the laws anyway.” 71 Some also criticized Justice Kennedy’s assertion that expenditures would be transparent because they would be disclosed. 72 One lawyer rejected both of those assumptions:
The Kennedy opinion basically operates as follows. The First Amendment
protects spending by corporations and that does not pose any threat of corruption or the appearance of corruption because of two salient facts. One,
that by definition the spending is totally independent of a campaign so
there is no opportunity for corruption, and two, because the spending will
68. See Alschuler et al., supra note 3, at 27–28.
69. Confidential Interview 11.
70. Confidential Interview 28.
71. Confidential Interview 18.
72. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370–71 (2010) (“With the advent of the Internet, prompt
disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold
corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters. . . . This transparency
enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages”).
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be entirely transparent and subject to complete disclosure . . . . His whole
worldview is premised on these twin assumptions about the spending not
being coordinated and the spending being subject to disclosure. Neither of
those premises are correct in the real world. . . . Citizens United leeched
pretty quickly from just being a case about corporate spending to also kind
of a change in the law relating to contributions to political committees that
engage only in independent spending—Super PACs . . . Super
PACs . . . quickly mutated into this kind of sub-species of individual candidate Super PACs which are as a practical matter functioning basically
just as a soft money arm of the campaign. So, if you look at the relationship between a candidate . . . and that candidate’s individual candidate Super PAC, nobody in their right mind would describe that as an independent
operation that poses no threat of corruption when a donor gives a $10 million contribution to the Super PAC and essentially there’s no wall between
the donor, the Super PAC, and the candidate. It’s all one integrated operation. So that premise of the Kennedy opinion as it has been implemented
through the growth of individual candidate Super PACs . . . is just ludicrous. 73

Another lawyer made a similar argument about what the lawyer viewed as
the majority’s failure to anticipate the likely ramifications:
The Court didn’t know what the hell they were doing. . . . Now they knew
what they were doing in saying “[w]e don’t like restrictions, period.” But
they didn’t know what the implications were. They didn’t know they were
going to wind up with Super PACs and unlimited contributions flooding
the system and nonprofit groups spending hundreds of millions of dollars
in secret contributions. 74

A third defender stated that “the Roberts Court is very unrealistic about politics, intentionally unrealistic. I don’t think they’re naïve; I think they’re just
ignoring what’s going on.” 75
Many of the defenders asserted that the combination of the narrowed
definition of corruption adopted in Citizens United, the Court’s general skepticism about campaign finance regulation, and the FEC’s lack of enforcement of existing regulations, has resulted in an almost complete breakdown
of campaign finance regulation. These responses were typical:
[T]he experiment we’re running today, which is largely result of Citizens
United and the kind of implementation of the vision of the five conservative justices, is an experiment in basically a completely deregulated campaign finance system. There are still rules on the books. There are still
contribution limits on the books. There are still disclosure rules on the
books, which the Roberts Court purports to uphold and support. . . . But,
73. Confidential Interview 6.
74. Confidential Interview 18.
75. Confidential Interview 11.
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as a practical matter in the real world, if you look at the 2016 campaign,
what you see is a world in which there are no contribution limits. And as
a practical matter, it’s so easy for individuals and candidates to get around
disclosure rules that anybody who’s interested in avoiding the disclosure
rules can do so. So as a practical matter, we’re living in a world without
contribution limits and disclosure rules. 76
[Citizens United] has led all these other things to start to tumble
down. . . . [I]t was kind of a signal to the world and to the lower courts to
not take these laws very seriously and to start thinking about ways to get
rid of them. A lot of what you’ve seen is people just ignoring them, in
terms of setting up these Super PACs and using them basically as campaign arms. . . . Because nobody thinks any of these laws are constitutional anymore and so they don’t pay [attention to them] . . . . And the
FEC has gotten itself into a position where it doesn’t enforce anything
because the Republicans have gotten into the position of absolutism on
these laws, all of it encouraged indirectly by Citizens United. So they don’t
think any of these laws should be enforced and then they won’t let any of
these laws be enforced, and so the whole thing has kind of unraveled. And
it’s going to continue to unravel, I think. 77

Another lawyer said that Citizens United “open[ed] the door for the destruction of the campaign finance regime that the Court had upheld for decades.” 78
The larger consequences of the deregulation of campaign finance, defenders say, is increased inequality in the political process and a grave threat
to the future of American democracy. Their comments on the consequences
of Citizens United are filled with references to the need to protect the integrity of elections and political equality against the outsized influence of
wealthy individuals and commercial corporations. Their words evoke images
of physical power, intimidation, coercion, and control by those who would
harm vulnerable democratic processes:
I think this is a world that’s largely dominated by the smallest segment of
the richest people in the country who have the ability to stand up a presidential candidate or congressional candidate, and just on the power of
money take that candidate very, very far down the road, and certainly bend
candidates to their will in terms of policy positions and positions on issues.
You look at the spectacle of candidates. . . the Republican candidates,
traipsing to Las Vegas and kind of bending the knee to Sheldon Adelson,
and you have to ask questions about whether this is really the way our
government should work, or politics should work, or democracy should
work. And whether the kinds of extreme, increasingly extreme forms of
inequality that characterize society generally, and characterize sort of the
76.
77.
78.

Confidential Interview 6.
Confidential Interview 21.
Confidential Interview 18.
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economic sphere, should leech over to such an extreme extent into the
political sphere. 79
It’s hard to doubt all the ways in which Citizens United has kind of undermined our democracy by allowing corporations and the wealthy to spend
huge amounts of money to help elect candidates to do their bidding. 80
The ramifications of [Citizens United] are huge. . . You have millionaires
and billionaires playing a dominant role . . . with unlimited contributions
to so-called individual candidate Super PACs that are . . . not independent;
they’re arms of the campaigns. We’ve had hundreds of millions of dollars
of secret money coming into the campaigns. We have corporate money,
mostly in the form of money spent by incorporated nonprofits, but that
was prohibited prior to this decision. . . . [Citizens United] basically says
that democracy has no capacity to protect itself from corruption when
you’re dealing with the right of people to spend money. 81
In McConnell, the Court upheld a system that, while not perfect, went a
long way towards limiting the ability of wealthy individuals and corporations to essentially control the process. And in Citizens United, . . . the
Court completely undermined that whole system of regulating money in
politics. 82
The Roberts Court [is] giving us the Anatole France First Amendment,
which means that the First Amendment in its majestic impartiality allows
gigantic corporations and ordinary citizens alike to spend as much as they
want electing their preferred candidates to office. And that’s the vision of
equality and of the First Amendment that we’re left with. It is a completely
sterile and formalistic view of rights and how they play out in our democracy, and it leaves people who don’t have money, don’t have immense
aggregations of wealth that they can spend on politics . . . with less of a
voice, and it leaves us with a system where . . . the strength of your voice
depends on the size of your wallet. That’s not what democracy is supposed
to look like. 83
Pick up any newspaper on any day this year. . . . And you’ll see an article
about the problems that Citizens United has [along with other campaign
finance decisions by the Roberts Court] caused. My own view is that
money in politics, big money in big politics, creates an inherent, inescapable risk of corruption, properly defined as including influence and access,
a definition the Court rejected or abandoned. And I think it’s important
because I think the net result nationally is that there’s less speech going
on in the country as voters get turned off, and potential voters get turned
off and saddened and disgusted by the apparent fact that the candidates,
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Confidential Interview 6.
Confidential Interview 7.
Confidential Interview 18.
Confidential Interview 22.
Confidential Interview 23.
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virtually all of them, are dependent on a small handful of very wealthy
people to fund their campaign and to help them develop, or push them into
the positions they take. I think that has potentially dire consequences for
participatory democracy. 84

The defenders generally agreed that Citizens United has been highly
consequential in terms of the public’s reaction. One called it “an interesting
case because of the resonance in popular culture of the decision.” 85 Another
called the political effect of the decision “enormous” because “it’s become a
talking point in an age of inequality”:
It is a rallying cry. So to the extent that people have criticisms of the Roberts [C]ourt or to the bias of our governing institutions at a time where you
have this massive disparity in wealth and growing disparity and diminishing middle class, both purchasing power and prospects, you have Citizens
United as an example of a country that has built-in protections for privilege. And this is the Supreme Court’s contribution. Congress makes its
own contribution, right? Wall Street makes its contribution. But this is the
Supreme Court’s contribution to advancing the political position of the
well-to-do at a time when the relative position of the well-to-do to the rest
of the country and the tilt of public policy toward the well-to-do is such a
central topic in our political debate. 86

Another asserted that Citizens United has led people of diverse political perspectives to take notice of an issue they had not previously considered:
People have heard of Citizens United and they do not like it. I think that
there are large numbers of people from across the political spectrum who
are becoming aware that we have a political system that is not functioning
effectively. And they may have different views about what it would mean
for it to function effectively and different views about things like guns and
abortion. But I don’t think that very many members of the public think
that what the system really needs is larger infusions of corporate cash. 87

Some defenders also worried about the pervasive public cynicism they
believed had resulted from campaign finance deregulation. One lawyer, for
example, observed that campaign finance abuses revealed during Watergate
“had the country set its hair on fire in the early ‘70s” but “are just commonplace now” and that the country had become “inured” to such abuses:
On the one hand, I think people are still very, very upset about it, but
there's a kind of sense of hopelessness about being able to do anything . . . . We’re at this moment where things that just outraged the public

84.
85.
86.
87.

Confidential Interview 26.
Confidential Interview 10.
Confidential Interview 12.
Confidential Interview 34.
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following Watergate now are just being met with a sense of futility and, I
think, somewhat with a sense of despair. 88

IV.THE CHALLENGERS’ VIEWS
Like the defenders, the sixteen challengers worked in a variety of practice settings. But they were more diverse than the defenders in terms of the
constituencies they claimed to represent, the law schools they attended, and
the location of their offices. In these respects, these lawyers’ characteristics
mirrored those of the larger pool of lawyers who represented parties and
amici on the side of Citizens United. 89 Some were libertarians, some Republican establishment figures, and others business advocates, Tea Partiers, and
civil libertarians. Most of the challengers described themselves as Republicans or Independents, although two were Democrats. The lawyers’ particular
positions in Citizens United varied with the interests and commitments of
their clients, but all of them indicated that they believed that most campaign
finance regulation is unconstitutional.
When asked about what was at stake in Citizens United, the challengers
endorsed the Court’s assertion that it was necessary to strike down these limitations and precedents to vindicate the First Amendment. Their responses
included frequent references to the “marketplace of ideas” and “free speech”
and they often characterized campaign finance regulations as censorship.
These comments about the stakes in Citizens United were typical:
[It was] whether the government gets to determine who speaks, how much,
on what, for how long, very foundational things to the way that our government works. [The decision] reaffirmed the importance of free speech.
You’re going to have more groups that will not be hesitant about expressing their views collectively in the public realm. 90
Rather than limiting speech, we should let more speech enter the marketplace of ideas. 91
This is an issue of free speech versus government control and ultimately
censorship. 92

88. Confidential Interview 6.
89. See Southworth, supra note 36 (finding that lawyers filing briefs on Citizens United’s side were
more likely than lawyers on the FEC’s side to work in the South or Midwest, and that they were less
likely than lawyers on the reform side to have attended law schools ranked in the top twenty by U.S. News
and World Report).
90. Confidential Interview 8.
91. Confidential Interview 3.
92. Confidential Interview 25.
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I think it just promotes the freedom of speech. That’s what I think the main
implications of it are. 93
I don’t think the government has any business telling people what they can
say, when they can say it, how they can say it, at what times, and in what
volumes, wearing what color hat, and hopping on which leg . . . . How
about we just go with free speech? 94
You can’t have free speech and exclude millions of organizations, like the
ACLU, like the Chamber of Commerce, like the AFL-CIO, like the corporations, from the marketplace. . . Citizens United I just think is one of
the best First Amendment decisions ever written. . . . The First Amendment says, almost without exception, what we say is our choice and not
the government’s choice. And how loud we say it, or how much we say it
is our choice and not the government’s choice. So I think it’s a great decision. 95
I think that it has freed people to be able to . . . organizations like the NRA,
or other issue organizations, to be able to speak on behalf of their members
at election time without fear of being sanctioned or fined. 96
[H]aving corporate speech and commercial speech added to the marketplace of ideas benefits democracy as a whole. 97
[G]overnment cannot screw with the marketplace of ideas. 98
[The statutory provision invalidated in Citizens United] violates the corporations’ First Amendment rights not to be silenced. 99
[I]t simply cannot be forgotten that the government’s position in Citizens
United was that it could ban a documentary movie about a political candidate during an election year. 100
We’ve helped ideas get into the marketplace . . . . That’s a good outcome.
I don’t care where that money comes from. 101
[T]o limit money in politics is to simply limit communication or limit
speech. It’s very simple and very straightforward and very true. And
there’s simply no refutation of that, that is possible. So, if you’re limiting
money, you’re limiting speech. 102

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Confidential Interview 39.
Confidential Interview 14.
Confidential Interview 32.
Confidential Interview 36.
Confidential Interview 42.
Confidential Interview 25.
Confidential Interview 2.
Confidential Interview 44.
Confidential Interview 14.
Confidential Interview 43.
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Some challengers emphasized, as the defenders generally conceded,
that the decision has not resulted in massive corporate spending on elections.
One lawyer stressed that “there’s not been much corporate money, despite
all the predictions of cataclysm,” 103 and another noted that predictions that
Citizens United would lead to a flood of corporate spending on the 2016
presidential race were “totally wrong.” 104 Like the defenders, many of the
challengers emphasized that most of the increased spending attributable to
Citizens United and SpeechNow.org has come from wealthy individuals and
not from public for-profit corporations:
The major effect wasn’t felt by . . . Fortune 500 corporations. . . . The
sorts of entities that people think about when they talk about, “Oh, there’s
too much corporate money[.]” Because that money hasn’t really increased.
It’s Super PACs or advocacy groups of the kind like the National Federation of Independent Business, or Planned Parenthood, or the
NRA . . . . Most of the increased spending . . . has been in independent advocacy groups and individuals—whether that’s Tom Steyer or Sheldon
Adelson, or the Koch brothers . . . . There is more independent spending
now, but it’s not your Microsofts and your Googles and your Exxons and
the traditional big corporations. 105

Another lawyer observed that despite all the editorials “talking about how
big corporations were going to rule America,” that has not happened. Rather,
he said, “[i]t’s the Adelsons” and other very wealthy individuals who “[a]fter
Citizens United . . . started to spend the money that Buckley v. Valeo
would’ve allowed them to spend, and which was sometimes spent, but not at
all as much as is now becoming the norm in American politics.” 106
Several of the challengers decried the increased role of Super PACs and
other vehicles for independent spending and their tendency to expand the
influence of extreme and unaccountable elements at the expense of the major
political parties. But some challengers offered a more positive account of the
infusion of money into politics since Citizens United and SpeechNow.org,
calling it evidence of healthy political engagement. One said that it “shows,
sort of bottled up demand for participation in elections, which has been unleashed,” 107 and another claimed that the decisions have “led to increased
participation.” 108 One lawyer approved of how Super PACs enabled fifteen

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Confidential Interview 32.
Confidential Interview 31.
Confidential Interview 13.
Confidential Interview 31.
Confidential Interview 37.
Confidential Interview 16.
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Republican candidates to compete for the 2016 Republican presidential nomination, “kind of buoying them along independently. . . keeping them going
with their messages.” 109 Another lawyer cited several instances in which an
injection of Super PAC funding has fueled competition between candidates
in races that would otherwise have been a lock: “It’s been good for competition. It gets new ideas out, which [is] good.” 110
Like some defenders, who argued that the consequences of Citizens
United have been more “psychological” than legal, some challengers said
that the primary result of Citizens United has been that it clarified where the
lines were and emboldened people and organizations to spend money in elections:
As a legal matter, all the ruling did was erase the express advocacy line
that unions and corporations, both business and non-profit, could not cross
in their public communications, which was really not, to me, a practically
meaningful line anyway. One could message effectively towards whatever
electoral result one wanted without having to explicitly say, “vote for” or
“vote against.” I actually thought it was an unconstitutional restriction. I
believe the decision was fundamentally correct. But I think the consequence has been more cultural than legal, in that it has relaxed, to some
degree, strictures that organizations and perhaps individuals put on themselves in part because they were afraid there were lines out there. 111

Another lawyer explained that, for decades prior to Citizens United, the FEC
“was quite experimental in devising legal standards which they would do
primarily through selective enforcement” and that people and organizations
subject to these standards tended to settle rather than fight. 112 He maintained
that Citizens United clarified the law and “basically established rules that
people could follow” and “eliminated a great deal of uncertainty as to what
the rules were.” 113
As for critics’ complaints about the definition of corruption used in Citizens United, challengers defended the Supreme Court’s approach. One complained that “the bounds of the term ‘corruption’” prior to Citizens United
“had gotten scarily out of control—that corruption. . . . Well, it could mean
almost anything associated with money in politics.” 114 Other challengers
suggested that any definition that goes beyond quid pro quo corruption is

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
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Confidential Interview 16.
Id.
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inconsistent with representative democracy. 115 Several lawyers asserted that
there is no principled distinction between influence based on financial power
and influence based on the techniques used by community organizers to get
out the vote, or the influence wielded by celebrities and the mainstream media. 116
Several challengers acknowledged that Citizens United is unpopular but
chalked that up to the public’s misunderstanding. One insisted that the decision’s consequences have been “overstated,” 117 and another said that they
have been “very different than what the Left would have you believe.” 118
115. See, e.g., Confidential Interview 25 (“If you have a government whose main check is the will
of the people, so to speak, then people are going clamor to influence politics and get government to do
what they want it to. That’s not a good thing, but in a free society with a representative form of government if you call that corruption then you’re saying that the government itself is corrupt in some sense,
which I actually think is true.”).
The view that politicians’ responsiveness to donors is a necessary feature of democracy is suggested by the Supreme Court in Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and again in McCutcheon v. FEC,
134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014), which invalidated overall limits on the total contributions an individual can give
in an election cycle. In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy wrote:
Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics. It is in the nature of
an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those policies. It is well understood that a substantial and
legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one
candidate over another is that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes
the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on responsiveness.
558 U.S. at 359 (alteration in original) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310). In his majority
opinion for the Court in McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts wrote:
For the past 40 years, our campaign finance jurisprudence has focused on the need to preserve
authority for the Government to combat corruption, without at the same time compromising the
political responsiveness at the heart of the democratic process, or allowing the Government to
favor some participants in that process over others. As Edmund Burke explained in his famous
speech to the electors of Bristol, a representative owes constituents the exercise of his “mature
judgment,” but judgment informed by “the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the
most unreserved communication with his constituents.” Constituents have the right to support
candidates who share their views and concerns. Representatives are not to follow constituent
orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive to those concerns. Such responsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance through elected officials.
134 S. Ct. at 1461–62 (citation omitted).
Several of the defenders strongly disagreed with this understanding of representative government and the meaning of Burke’s speech. One observed:
It was actually interesting that what they quoted was from Burke about how representatives . . .
should feel beholden to their supporters. Well, he was talking about voters and constituents. He
wasn’t talking about donors! But the court conflated all of that and said basically that there’s
nothing wrong with an office holder feeling beholden to large donors. That’s politics. Well, I
think that was really dangerous, and that was really significant.
Confidential Interview 11.
116. Confidential Interviews 37, 43, 44.
117. Confidential Interview 19.
118. Confidential Interview 36.
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Another claimed that the decision has “served to sharpen debate about campaign finance laws” but “generally at a very simplistic and almost cartoonish
level. . . . People use [Citizens United] as a shorthand, and they don’t even
know what they’re using it as a shorthand for. 119 Another challenger remarked that “most of the on-the-ground criticism . . . on what’s happened as
a result [of Citizens United] is inaccurate to the point of distortion.” 120
V. DIVERGENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE LESSONS OF CITIZENS UNITED
The lawyers on the two sides do not disagree fundamentally about how
Citizens United has affected the political process in the short-term. They
agree that it has not (yet) unleased a huge wave of direct corporate spending
in elections but that it has channeled more corporate money into nonprofit
groups, some of which do not disclose their sources. They agree that Citizens
United led directly to the D.C. Circuit’s momentous ruling in SpeechNow.org. They agree that Super PACs have since multiplied and grown and
that most of the money contributed to Super PACs and other types of outside
groups has come from wealthy individuals. They also agree that the primary
short-term consequences of Citizens United have been more psychological
than legal, in that they have clarified the lines and emboldened those who
wish to put money in politics to do so without fear of sanction.
But the lawyers offered very different perspectives on whether Citizens
United has been good or bad for the political process and what lessons the
public should learn. The defenders generally said that the Court’s holding
that commercial corporations possess the same First Amendment rights as
natural persons to spend money on elections is a dangerous turn and that the
Court’s narrowing of the corruption rationale had contributed to disproportionate political influence by economically powerful institutions and individuals. The challengers applauded the decision as a victory for free speech and
insisted that any adverse fallout from Citizens United was a price worth paying to protect the free flow of ideas.
Disagreement between the defenders and challengers on the larger lessons of Citizens United appear to reflect very different attitudes about government and the possibility of fairly regulating money in politics without
stifling political association and dissent. The defenders envisioned an essential and positive role for government in ensuring fair elections and political
equality. The challengers, on the other hand, were skeptical about government in general and especially about whether government can be trusted to
119. Confidential Interview 19.
120. Confidential Interview 31.
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regulate money in politics. They viewed the regulation of political spending
as an intrusion on individual liberty.
Many of the defenders asserted that government has a responsibility to
ensure that inequalities in the economic sphere do not subvert democratic
processes. One argued that “it’s the government’s duty to intervene, to try to
retain some rough sense of political equality in the country. And to the extent
that money becomes a mechanism by which one person can exercise outsized
political power, then I think it is appropriate for the government to step
in.” 121 Another said that government “has a role to ensure that our rights as
Americans are protected in the political process,” so that “when it comes to
money in politics, that means ensuring that our voices are not drowned out
by big money interests, that we have a right to equal participation in the process, and that we’re not locked out of an exclusionary process that determines who shall govern in America.” 122 The same lawyer asserted that
what has happened with the campaign finance system is we have allowed
those economic inequalities to spill over and dominate our political process, so much so that the vast majority of the public believes that our system is rigged. . . . And that undermines the faith in our elections but also
in our government. 123

Many of the challengers suggested that the concern about money in politics would disappear if conservatives succeeded in rolling back government.
One libertarian stressed that “[t]he problem isn’t money in politics; the problem is the government has accumulated too much power that it doesn’t
rightly possess, particularly at the federal level. . . . [If the government were
much more limited] we wouldn’t have [the] massive concern that we have
about money in politics.” 124 Another acknowledged “discomfort” with the
amount of money in politics, but pointed out that “the conservative response
is, ‘[l]ook, if you want money out of politics, get government out of our lives.
And then, there’s no real impetus for the money to be there in the first
place.’” 125 Another explained that
if access and influence are a problem, they are a problem because of the
size and scope of government. What we’re concerned about is the government is going to hand out favors that it shouldn’t be handing out or it’s
going to be doling out punishment to people who should not be punished. 126
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Confidential Interview 28.
Confidential Interview 49.
Id.
Confidential Interview 3.
Confidential Interview 14.
Confidential Interview 37.
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Some challengers were skeptical about whether it’s even possible to
regulate campaign finance. One said, “[y]ou’re never going to get money out
of politics.” 127 A lawyer who said that he shared some of defenders’ concerns
about money in politics nevertheless believed that “in the end . . . efforts to
regulate them do not work.” 128 Another challenger claimed that “realistically
I think that money finds a way whatever the rules are,” 129 while another referred to this as the “hydraulic” theory of campaign finance 130—that “when
you clamp down on money[ ] in one place, it tends to pop up someplace
else.” 131 A libertarian stated,
I think we have more political speech now than we ever did, and if the
billionaires have more to say, what else is new? And if you limit them,
they’re going to go buy a newspaper, and if you limit that, they’re going
to fund a cause organization. You know, you can’t stop it without having
the kind of total control that we usually associate with North Korea or
places like that. 132

Many challengers claimed that campaign finance regulations invariably
advantage those writing the rules, typically incumbents, and tend to be used
cynically for strategic political advantage. One said that
when you watch what happens at the FEC, you can’t help but recognize
that the vast majority of complaints have nothing to do with corruption or
access or anything else. They have to do with “[t]his will hinder my opponent in this race.” That’s what these things are primarily used for. 133

Another lawyer noted that the “accommodations and compromises” made as
part of the process to achieve campaign finance regulation always “jigger[]
the system . . . to the perceived benefit or detriment of certain participants.” 134
Most of the challengers supported only minimal campaign finance regulations, and some favored no regulation at all. One advocate said that he
supported the goals articulated by defenders, including “fairness, . . . some
measure of transparency, and . . . integrity,” but that “reform proposals go
127. Confidential Interview 42.
128. Confidential Interview 44.
129. Confidential Interview 35.
130. For the origins of this term, see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708, 1718 (1999) (arguing that “political money, like
water, has to go somewhere. It never really disappears into thin air” and calling this the “hydraulic principle”); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (“Money, like water, will always find an
outlet.”).
131. Confidential Interview 37.
132. Confidential Interview 32.
133. Confidential Interview 44.
134. Confidential Interview 16.
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way beyond that.” 135 Several challengers asserted that disclosure is all that
is required to ensure the integrity of the process. 136 Even as to disclosure,
some of the challengers expressed skepticism, because they thought that that
those drafting and enforcing disclosure rules would use them to punish political enemies. One lawyer suggested that some conservatives who had previously supported disclosure “now see how it’s being abused and potentially
abused, in that it’s being used a weapon.” 137 Several challengers mentioned
the Internal Revenue Service scandal involving increased scrutiny of taxexempt status applications from groups with “Tea Party” or “Patriot” in their
names as evidence that government could not be trusted to wield power responsibly. 138
Several of the libertarians and lawyers associated with Tea Party groups
maintained that government should play no role whatsoever with respect to
campaign finance. One said that the proper role of government with respect
to money in politics is “essentially none.” 139 Another advocated giving campaign contributions the same constitutional protection as expenditures and
lifting all other campaign finance restrictions: we “should criminalize bribery, purchasing of favors, that sort of thing, and that’s it. I don’t think political speech should be regulated.” 140 One lawyer proudly noted that he is so
committed to deregulating campaign finance that he filed an amicus brief in
Bluman v. Federal Election Commission 141 to argue that non-citizens who
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Confidential Interview 2 (“Ultimately the voters decide who will be running the government, and if they want a government that is corrupt then they’ll vote for that and if they want a government that is not corrupt then they’ll vote for that.”); Confidential Interview 39 (“The view I take is all
the regulations should be removed and all that should be required is public reporting. As long as there’s
public reporting that’s required then it’s up to the voters to decide. Okay, so you have a candidate and he
takes money from the tobacco industry or he takes money from the oil industry or he takes money from
the crypto-Marxist groups or he takes money from foreign countries, alright, so you just report it. . . . So,
now, it’s up to you. You’re the voter, you decide. This guy is taking money from whoever it is, billionaires, industry, labor unions, Marxist groups, so whichever it is. You know where he gets his money, it’s
up to you to decide. It’s not up to the government to say, ‘[y]ou can’t take money to present your views
to the public.’”).
137. Confidential Interview 16.
138. See Emily Cochrane, Justice Department Settles with Tea Party Groups After I.R.S. Scrutiny,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/us/politics/irs-tea-party-lawsuit-settlement.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/4ANG-DJLV]. The Inspector General’s report of cases between 2004
and 2013 found that the IRS had targeted not only conservative groups but also liberal organizations
whose names included terms such as “Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
(ACORN),” “Progressive,” “Green Energy,” “Medical Marijuana,” and “Occupy.” TREASURY
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, REF. NO. 2017-10-054, REVIEW OF
SELECTED CRITERIA USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW (2017),
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2017reports/201710054fr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MUNJLRC].
139. Confidential Interview 3.
140. Confidential Interview 13.
141. 565 U.S. 1104 (2012) (mem.).
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are lawfully within the United States should be allowed to spend money or
make contributions in U.S. elections.
The language used by the defenders and challengers in interviews differed in some easily quantifiable ways. Defenders used “equal” and “equality” almost four times as often as challengers and “democracy” six times as
often. Challengers used variations on “speech” and “speaker” twice as often
as defenders and “freedom” and “liberty” three times as frequently.
Differences in the commentary of the defenders and challengers appear
to reflect not just contrasting policy positions and the conscious manipulation of language and precedent, but also variation in underlying conceptual
metaphors. As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have shown, metaphor is
pervasive in everyday language and thought and in the way we view and
experience the world, although its influence is often invisible to us. 142 Lakoff
has also argued that conservatives and progressives hold conflicting and typically unconscious worldviews structured through metaphor. 143 Conceptual
metaphor also pervades legal thought and reasoning, 144 and it plays an important role in campaign finance jurisprudence. The “marketplace of ideas”
concept elaborated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in Abrams v.
United States 145 imagines ideas as commodities that are bought, sold and
traded in a competitive market. 146 That frame looms large in the Supreme
Court Justices’ disagreements about the boundaries of permissible campaign

142. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).
143. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES
THINK (3d ed. 2016).
144. See, e.g., STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW LIFE, AND MIND, at xiii (2001)
(explaining that the book’s purpose is to explore the social constructs that “animate thinking and decisionmaking among lawyers, judges, and laypersons alike”); MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 68 (1992) (asserting that legal metaphors are the products of “history and usage,” which shape their “deepest meanings and applications,”
and arguing that “the rise of a natural entity theory of the corporation was a major factor in legitimating
big business” ); GORDON, supra note 11, at 128 (noting that judicial reasoning is “primarily doctrinal,
categorical, and analogical”); id. at 261 (observing that “our views [of the past’s relationship to the present] are mediated by familiar narrative story-lines that are so deeply entrenched in our consciousness
that we are often unaware of their rule over our conception of reality. These story-lines, like other mentalities, have a history filled with ideological purposes, and there always exist—and so we always may
draw upon—competing stories that impress the same historical experience with radically divergent meanings”).
145. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen men have realized that time has
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”).
146. See WINTER, supra note 144, at 18–19, 20, 271–73.
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finance regulation. 147 Metaphorical thinking also underlies Buckley’s holding that spending money to sway an election is speech, 148 as well as Citizens
United’s ruling that corporations enjoy the same First Amendment protections as natural persons with respect to campaign spending and that singling
out corporations for special treatment constitutes a type of impermissible
discrimination. 149
Commentary by the interviewed lawyers shows both sides using the
same metaphors. But, while many of the challengers found these metaphors
dispositive, defenders emphasized their limitations and argued that, even if
useful, they must be tweaked to make sense of the First Amendment’s
broader purposes.
Defenders focused on the need to regulate markets to ensure their integrity and correct for market failure. One observed that the marketplace of
ideas metaphor as it applies to money in elections is “powerful” but that “the
question is, like any marketplace, is there no role for regulation within that
147. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010) (“Austin interferes with the ‘open
marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First Amendment”) (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez
Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 279–80 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] legislative judgment that ‘enough is enough’ should command the greatest possible deference
from judges interpreting a constitutional provision that, at best, has an indirect relationship to activity that
affects the quantity—rather than the quality or the content—of repetitive speech in the marketplace of
ideas.”); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809–10 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (“Massachusetts could permissibly conclude that not to impose limits upon the political activities of corporations would have placed it in a position of departing from neutrality and indirectly assisting the
propagation of corporate views because of the advantages its laws give to the corporate acquisition of
funds to finance such activities. Such expenditures may be viewed as seriously threatening the role of the
First Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas.”); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434,
1467 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Speech does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, political communication
seeks to secure government action. A politically oriented ‘marketplace of ideas’ seeks to form a public
opinion that can and will influence elected representatives.”).
148. For key language in Buckley suggesting that spending money on elections is protected speech,
see supra note 25 and accompanying text. The Buckley Court also analogized a political campaign to an
automobile and election spending to gas in the tank. 424 U.S. 1, 19 n.18 (1976) (“Being free to engage in
unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile
as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline.”).
The argument that election spending is speech gained currency when Justice Potter Stewart articulated the now widely used shorthand for the challengers’ position—money is speech—in oral argument: “We are talking about speech, money is speech and speech is money, whether it is buying television
or radio time or newspaper advertising, or even buying pencils and paper and microphones.” ROBERT E.
MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 55
(1988).
149. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 343 (stating that corporations should not “be treated differently
under the First Amendment simply because [they] are not ‘natural persons’” (quoting Belotti, 435 U.S. at
776)); id. at 347 (“[T]he First Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on the
speaker’s corporate identity.”).
For examples of scholarship discussing of the significance (or insignificance) of the Court’s use
of the corporate personhood metaphor in Citizens United, see Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional
Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95 (2014), and Tamara R. Piety, Why Personhood Matters,
30 CONST. COMMENT. 361 (2015).
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marketplace?” 150 Another mused that “[t]here is no real, unregulated marketplace of free ideas, right? . . . You’re not gonna compete with folks with millions of dollars who buy the instrumentalities to get their opinions across if
you’re a guy standing on the street corner.” 151 Another contended that “[l]ike
in capitalism, you can’t leave it—the use of money in politics—unfettered
because I think it just leads to real abuses.” 152
The defenders also argued that the First Amendment is about more than
free speech—that it also protects the conditions necessary for citizens to govern themselves in a representative democracy. These comments were typical:
I’ve always thought that the First Amendment serves a larger purpose in
preserving our democracy than simply guaranteeing free speech for everybody. . . I think it also serves, was intended to serve, as a sort of fundamental building block of the democratic process. And so I’m not a First
Amendment absolutist who believes that any government regulation of
speech even through the proxy of money is necessarily inconsistent with
the First Amendment values. If, in fact, there’s enough of a demonstration
that government regulation is needed in order to maintain a democratic
structure, that certain voices don’t overwhelm other voices and don’t discourage participation . . . I think that that can constitute a compelling interest to allow the government to regulate . . . in a modest way and limited
fashion . . . And in particular, I think government can take affirmative actions, as long as they’re done on a non-discriminatory basis, and without
impinging on other people’s freedoms, to encourage people to participate
in the process, and to level the playing field in a way that wouldn’t otherwise exist if we just relied upon pure money as the end-all-be-all of who
could speak and how much. 153
There’s a tendency to apply the First Amendment as a literal statement
that you take out of context and you give an open-ended pass to anybody
who’s purportedly speaking. And that’s not necessarily the way that the
Constitution was designed to work. It was a total document and that document is supposed to preserve integrity. And if the speech is out of control,
and of course calling money speech is a huge step, but if it’s out of control,
then that’s not consistent with the Constitution taken as a whole. 154
The Court is just turning the Constitution on its head when it’s saying,
“[w]ell, it’s only that individual corruption you can get at but a more systemic corruption that threatens the system’s dependence on the people is
beyond review. . . . History shows the majority’s reinterpreting the First
Amendment and ignoring the really important powers that Congress and

150. Confidential Interview 28.
151. Confidential Interview 48.
152. Confidential Interview 11.
153. Confidential Interview 27.
154. Confidential Interview 33.
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state legislatures have to root out corruption to ensure electoral integrity. 155

The challengers, on the other hand, generally endorsed the equation of
political spending and speech, and many of them characterized campaign finance regulation as censorship. One, for example, warned about the dangers
of the reasoning that leads defenders to favor regulation:
Some of the campaign finance reform groups . . . [argue] that the First
Amendment imposes almost an obligation on the government to limit
speech so that the speech of the powerful does not drown out the speech
of the not powerful—in other words, leveling the playing field by lowering the volume of debate . . . I find that a very troubling prospect. It’s troubling not only because it does limit free and open debate, but it also has to
vest someone with the authority to determine what level of debate we want
and that someone who determines the level of debate we want is also going
to be in a position presumably to determine how much criticism people
can venture about where that volume has been set.156

Another said of efforts to regulate access, influence and systemic corruption,
“[they] pose tremendous dangers . . . to open democratic debate, when
you’re giving government this power.” 157 Another challenger explained that
his organization’s position in Citizens United was simple: “Look, this is an
issue of free speech versus government control and ultimately censorship.” 158
Several lawyers associated with conservative and libertarian organizations claimed that campaign finance regulation reflected a desire by liberals,
the media, and even some in the Republican establishment, to stifle dissent
and keep elites in charge. One lawyer described the deregulation of campaign
finance as a “free market” solution to money in politics and contrasted that
approach with the “socialist solution,” which is that “government must be in
our lives and regulate every corner of it and . . . prevent people from speaking out about the government and regulation in our lives.” 159 He chalked up
campaign finance restrictions to elites’ disdain for conservatives:
The liberal thinks you’re stupid because you’re not voting the right way
because if you were, if you were smart, you’d vote for them. And because
you’re not voting for them, clearly, you’re stupid and you don’t know what
you’re doing, and we have to prevent you from voting just because
you saw a TV ad. Clearly you’re dumb, you’re voting the way of the
last TV ad you saw. We have to stop this, we have to protect you from
these bad
155. Confidential Interview 7.
156. Confidential Interview 20.
157. Confidential Interview 44.
158. Confidential Interview 25.
159. Confidential Interview 14.
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ideas, so that you vote the right way, which is our way, and so we’re going
to institute all these protections to make it really hard for you to get bad
ideas in your head that will keep you from voting with us, which is the
right way to vote. That’s the liberal model.

Another lawyer active with libertarian groups said:
I don’t really understand the arguments against [Citizens United]. I don’t
understand what they’re afraid of. They’re not getting shouted down . . .
They’re the ones that have the dominant social positions. And I do have a
big problem with the state of America’s media, which I don’t think is performing their original function. It just tends to be completely party controlled—controlled primarily by the Democrat party, in my opinion. So
for any of these people on the Left to say, “[o]h we’re getting shouted
down by the billionaires.” You’re not getting shouted down by the billionaires; you’re shouting down everyone else! 160

A lawyer associated with Tea Party groups answered my question about the
government’s proper role with respect to money in politics with “What is
hard to understand about the first five words of the First Amendment: ‘Congress shall make no law’? I mean, I don’t think the government should have
a role. And I think what we’ve seen is an entire regulatory apparatus that is
bent upon silencing certain voices.” 161
Several defenders expressed frustration that the money-is-speech and
free market frames have worked so well in mobilizing opposition to campaign finance regulation. One said that “framing has been hugely important,
hugely important.” He argued that “the McCarthy experience” has “shaped
this generation and the generations after” and has fueled “mistrust over any
government regulatory power at all, but certainly government regulatory
power over communication.” That, in turn, “led to a framing of this as a
white hat/black hat problem, where the speaker always wore the white hat
and the regulator always wore the black hat.” 162 Another lawyer bemoaned
the challengers’ success in arguing that what’s at stake campaign finance
regulation is “not just a question of money; it’s a question of our ability to
criticize, our ability to speak out.” 163 Another defender drew a connection
between the speech metaphor’s power and defenders’ inability to persuade
the Republican base that deregulating campaign finance was not in their interests. He said that he wished that he could convince them that “nobody’s
trying to take away your right to stand on a street corner and scream, and do
all that!” but
160.
161.
162.
163.

Confidential Interview 39.
Confidential Interview 36.
Confidential Interview 28.
Id.
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all your screaming and yelling about an issue, or discussing, or debating,
or going to town hall meetings [will not matter]; the reason that you don’t
get a real debate is because, frankly, corporate lobbyists generally don’t
feel the need to go to those meetings because that’s not where the decisions are being made. 164

Several defenders lamented the rise and prevalence of the view that regulation is generally ineffective and fraught with unintended negative consequences and that rent-seeking inevitably corrupts policymaking. 165 One
argued that such profound mistrust of government explains how some opponents could advocate the complete deregulation of campaign finance; “if you
allow any regulation of it, it’s going to be abused—it’s going be used to suppress speech—and so, nope, you just can’t have any of it.” 166
Defenders acknowledged that they were at a disadvantage in mobilizing
a simple frame that can withstand constitutional challenge. The keywords
that arose most frequently in their responses to questions about the issues at
stake in campaign finance litigation—democracy, equality, voice, and integrity—do not add up to a winning legal theory given the Court’s recent precedents and current composition. One lawyer said, “[o]ne of the fundamental
problems that we are facing on the reform side is that, especially under the
Roberts Court, but also before that, starting with Buckley v. Valeo, the Court
has essentially ruled out some of the most compelling justifications for regulating campaign finance.” 167 Another asserted that it is “not simply a question of whether the money can corrupt an office holder, it’s a question of
whether it small c corrupts and undermines the integrity of the political system, of the government, and of course it does.” 168 Another insisted that “we
need a new jurisprudence that allows us to voice the goals of political equality and equal voice beyond just the interest in deterring corruption.” 169 Arguing that more could be done within the speech metaphor underlying forty
years of campaign finance doctrine by emphasizing the importance of
“voice”, another lawyer said, “[a]nd so, to me, the frames are about voice
and power, not about clean governance, not about anti-corruption, and less
164. Confidential Interview 11.
165. See BRINK LINDSEY & STEVEN M. TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY: HOW THE POWERFUL
ENRICH THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN GROWTH, AND INCREASE INEQUALITY 10 (2017) (criticizing conservatives and libertarians who argue that “once government assumes any responsibility to regulate in a
given area . . . it is inevitable that rent-seeking will corrupt policymaking”); cf. Miguel A. Centeno &
Joseph N. Cohen, The Arc of Neoliberalism, 38 ANN. REV. SOC. 317, 318, 327–32 (2012) (exploring the
historical development of neoliberalism and shifts in the assumptions that framed how changing economic structural conditions and redistributions of political power were perceived and acted upon).
166. Confidential Interview 27.
167. Confidential Interview 23.
168. Confidential Interview 18.
169. Id.
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about integrity of our democracy.” 170 This approach “buys into the speech
frame a little bit,” but flips it to ask, “but what kind of voice do I have over
the decisions that affect my life, and should I be drowned out and should that
be equal?” 171 Another suggested that the challenge was even more fundamental:
We really need to reexamine the whole idea that money is speech. People
like Larry Tribe . . . get[ ] really mad when you say that: “That’s an oversimplification, that’s a bumper sticker, that’s not . . . .” But the truth is that
has been kind of the guiding star for the Supreme Court since Buckley—
is that money is speech and that that’s the end of the analysis. And I think
they’ve got to go back to looking at, “[y]es, money can facilitate speech,
just like loud speakers can facilitate speech or newspaper delivery trucks
facilitate speech,” but we don’t just say you can’t regulate newspaper delivery trucks, because they are speech. That’s kind of what we do with
money. So I think that’s just totally wrongheaded. 172

Another defender asserted that “Citizens United is just not gonna stand” and
that when the Court eventually overturns the decision “it’s going to be with
a broader rationale than came out of the Buckley decision.” 173
Several lawyers observed that activists on opposing sides of this issue
see the world very differently and tend to talk past each other. One defender
said that conceptual frames affect not only how people convey ideas to others
but also “the way that people perceive things” and that “something that I may
perceive as being a reasonable effort to force somebody to come clean and
disclose, limit in some manner, the conservatives generally see as big bad
government coming in and stifling speech. And it’s like everything is really
viewed through that lens.” 174 A challenger explained that issues that “are really complicated” “tend to be reduced to slogans and little snippets of ‘reform’ or ‘freedom’ or ‘liberty.’ All of those values are implicated here, but
how it’s all implemented and how it operates is complex.” 175 A lawyer on
the challengers’ side who described himself as a rare moderate Republican
who believed that “Buckley largely got it right” asserted that “[t]he national
debate is insipid and stupid on both sides.” He spoke of the difficulty of “policing the line between contributions and expenditures” and ensuring that

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Confidential Interview 51.
Id.
Confidential Interview 46.
Confidential Interview 18.
Confidential Interview 27.
Confidential Interview 16.
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campaign finance regulations are “predictable and understood and not subject to political gamesmanship” in a “political environment where everyone’s just screaming at each other.” 176
VI. CONCLUSION
This Essay shows that lawyers on opposing sides of Citizens United
bring very different views to questions about money in politics in general
and to the consequences of the ruling in particular. They largely agree about
the decision’s direct consequences, but they offer wildly divergent conclusions about its lessons. Both sets of lawyers characterize the other side’s position as a danger to the future of representative democracy, and both sides
use populist rhetoric to explain their positions. But they identify different
sets of conditions as essential for democracy to thrive, and they identify different sets of elites as the primary threat. Defenders assert that campaign
finance regulation is necessary to ensure that citizens hold equal political
power corresponding with the one person one vote principle, and they see
those who oppose the restrictions at issue in Citizens United as too willing
to allow economic inequality to translate into political inequality. The challengers characterize themselves as the guardians of liberty and the First
Amendment, and they regard defenders as apologists for incumbents, the liberal media, censorship, and government overreach. Like the divided Justices
on the Roberts Court, the lawyers profiled in this Essay assert that the stakes
involved in campaign finance regulation are enormous, but they embrace incompatible visions of how the issues should be resolved. Their competing
visions appear to show not only differences in how the lawyers deploy language and frames to advance their clients’ positions but also a deep divide
between their worldviews, reflecting the contrasting perspectives of the polarized elites of which the lawyers (and Justices) are a part. 177

176. Confidential Interview 9.
177. See generally Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned
the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301; Mark A. Graber, The Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo?: Elite Opinion, Polarization, and the Direction of Judicial Decision Making, 56 HOW.
L.J. 661 (2013).

